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Letter to the Editor 
To the Editor: 
I would like to respond to two 
recent articles in Linacre Quarterly. 
First, I found the article "On 
Rescuing Frozen Embryos" (Aug. 
2002), fascinating. I've always been 
interested in moral questions, yet I 
humbly admit my amateur status. 
When I first heard of embryo rescue, 
I could find nothing morally 
objectionable. After reading the 
article, I was quite impressed with 
the moral arguments against it. 
However, I ultimately found Helen 
Watt's argument the most persuasive 
because she better addresses the 
science of the situation from which 
the moral analysis can proceed. 
The normal (or usual) "generative 
continuum" simply is not present in 
embryo rescue. As a matter of fact, 
the essential generative aspect -
conception - is absent in embryo 
rescue. I would propose that in this 
case, it is the issue of conception that 
defines the act as moral or not. 
Conceiving a child outside the 
marital act is clearly immoral. But 
once the child is present, we are past 
that moral question. Implanting that 
embryo into a rescuer's womb is not 
the same thing as conceiving a child. 
This pregnancy is not the same, 
either qualitatively or quantitatively, 
as a pregnancy resulting from the 
conception. The critical generative 
aspect (creation of new life) is not 
present. So, I would argue that the 
embryo rescuer's pregnancy does not 
violate the marital act because it 
lacks the creative aspect to which the 
marital act is ordained (It would also 
seem that issues of chastity and 
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fidelity would not be problematic 
since conception does not occur.). 
There are other considerations 
such as seemingly cooperating with 
or encouraging in vitro fertilization. 
Nonetheless IVF can still be and 
should be clearly condemned, while 
still attempting to legitimately help 
the child brought into being by this 
immoral procedure. 
Although this idea might seem 
crass, one might consider that, from a 
moral standpoint, the rescuer's womb 
might be viewed as a temporary 
organ donation , a kind of biological 
incubator, which the child uses 
temporarily for growth and 
development. 
Embryo rescue should be viewed 
as a heroic, charitable act of 
nurturing and of assisting the child to 
develop in a normal manner. 
Next, I would like to respond to 
"The Tragic Case of Jodie and Mary: 
Questions about Separating 
Conjoined Twins" (May, 2003). 
Dr. Kaczor makes some initial 
points that do not make sense to me. 
"Imagine a person living without 
organs through divine intervention." 
This is not a helpful observation. Are 
we to expect God to supply organs 
once they are removed? Later he 
notes that at early stages of 
development, the embryo survives 
without vital organs. But what is a 
vital organ at that stage? Of course 
there is no heart very early on, but the 
embryo does not need one at that 
time; it is not a vital organ at that 
time. He then rightly argues that 
removing vital organs per se is not 
wrong, but this must be coupled with 
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a procedure that replaces them or 
their function . To remove them 
without offering reasonable life 
sustaining therapy would be wrong, 
except maybe perhaps in some heroic 
organ donation which is freely 
chosen by the donor. Finally, he 
wrongly seems to equate a person 
being refused food and water with 
someone who voluntarily refuses 
food and water in a hunger strike. 
Again, a person may freely lay down 
his or her life for a just cause; but this 
is obviously different from an outside 
party imposing a lethal act. . 
But my main concern is with his 
analysis of intentional killing of the 
conjoined twins. If I properly 
understand his argument it is this: 
Under extreme circumstances, i.e. , to 
preserve the life of person A, it is licit 
to perform a clearly lethal procedure 
directly on person B which directly 
results in the death of person B as 
long as the death of person B is 
unintended and the actual death of 
person B does not cause the good 
effect of preserving the life of person 
A. Under thi s approach it is licit to 
separate the weaker twin . It would 
also be licit to perform a 
"therapeutic" abortion to save the life 
of the mother. 
I think this approach wrongly 
entangles intent and means - a 
"vexing problem" indeed. I would 
argue that in these situations, if a 
procedure which guarantees death is 
performed directly on a person, and it 
directly results in the death of that 
person, it is illicit because that 
person's death is a PRIMARY effect 
of the procedure; and the fact that his 
or her death is unintended and is not 
the cause of the good effect does not 
make it licit. 
In the classic principle of double 
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effect the bad effect should be a 
secondary effect as well as an 
unintended effect. When a diseased 
gravid maternal organ is removed, 
the procedure is directed at the 
diseased maternal organ. Its removal 
and the cure of the mother are 
primary effects of the procedure, and 
the loss of the child is a secondary 
unintended effect. Certainly 
procedures performed on patients 
may cause death, but these 
procedures are initiated with a 
reasonable hope and chance of 
success. But when a clearly lethal 
procedure is performed directly on a 
person, and it directly causes the 
death of that person, that person 's 
death is a primary effect of the action 
done and in my view is direct and 
intentional killing of an innocent 
human being regardless of the 
circumstances. So I would 
characterize Mary's death (as well as 
a "therapeutic abortion") as 
intentional killing. 
- James E. Brown, Jr., M.D. 
Metarie, LA 
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